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Illicit Money Flows as Motives for FDI 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the role of FDI in facilitating money laundering and illegal capital flight, 
focusing on transition economies’ FDI outflows because they largely reflect current investment 
decisions rather than the inertia of past decisions. We estimate a model of FDI outflows in which 
illicit money flows influence the volume of FDI directed toward countries considered to be 
centers of money laundering. We show that traditional models of FDI are not able to account for 
these investment flows and that our results are robust when additional explanatory variables such 
as host country tax rates, governance, corruption, and cultural differences between the home and 
host country are included in the model. We estimate that 6 to 10% of total FDI outflows and over 
20% of FDI to money-laundering countries from our sample were made to facilitate illicit money 
flows.  
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I. Introduction 
 In recent years, the study of the determinants of foreign direct investment flows 
(FDI) has stressed the role of non-traditional home- or host-country characteristics that tend to 
affect FDI inflows. These characteristics include host-country corruption (Drabek and Payne, 
2002; Wu, 2006) and status as a tax haven (Wei, 2000; Morck et al., 2008; Alfaro et al., 2008).  
The authors of these studies have been able to show that such nontraditional host-country 
characteristics, sometimes in combination with home-country environments and institutions, play 
an important role in determining bilateral FDI flows. This paper contributes to this literature by 
showing that FDI flows from a sample of transition economies are influenced by the host 
country’s status as a center for money laundering. Our sample of money-laundering host 
countries is characterized neither by low taxes, nor by status as a tax haven, nor by high levels of 
corruption. In fact, these host countries are largely not corrupt and have relatively high levels of 
taxes and good financial and regulatory institutions. Yet, we are able to show that higher than 
expected FDI flows to these countries cannot be explained entirely by drivers of FDI derived 
from the traditional theory of the multinational corporation (MNC), nor by the less traditional 
drivers mentioned above, and that the desire on the part of home-country investors to facilitate 
illicit money flows, including money laundering, explain a significant part of bilateral FDI flows 
between our sample of home and host countries. 
Illicit money flows, meaning flows of money that is either earned through, or used for, 
illegal activity or moved across borders illegally, may be as large as one trillion US dollars per 
year from developing countries alone (Kar and Cartright-Smith, n.d.). Worldwide money 
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laundering flows are estimated at $500million to $2.85 billion (Schneider and Windischbauer, 
2008), a range of estimates clearly indicative of the difficulties in measuring this illicit activity. 
Illicit financial flows of such magnitude should have a measurable impact on the pattern of 
international trade and investment in ways that differ from those predicted by traditional theories.  
 In this paper, we estimate the role of money laundering and illegal capital flight in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions by using data on FDI outflows from a sample of East 
European transition economies. FDI data from the transition economies are particularly useful 
because these countries’ FDI outflows better reflect current investment decisions due to the fact 
that these countries had virtually no outward FDI before 1995. Consequently the greater part of 
their FDI outflows reflects current investment decisions and their drivers rather than the inertia 
of past decisions. FDI flows from countries that have built up large stocks of FDI overseas will 
have some FDI outflows that reflect current decisions on moving funds from the home country to 
host countries but also a large volume of reinvested profits overseas that are driven largely by 
past decisions about where to invest that may or may not be related to the drivers of illicit capital 
flows.   
Because FDI from transition economies is a new phenomenon, the literature describing it 
is relatively undeveloped.1 In this paper we examine some of the trends in, and characteristics of, 
FDI outflows from transition countries and discuss the motivations behind them.  Our 
examination of the data suggests that, in addition to the traditional motivations for FDI found in 
1 See Kolotay (2004) and Radlo and Sass (forthcoming) for overviews of outward FDI from transition 
economies.  
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the literature on the multinational corporation (MNC), capital flight and the facilitation of money 
laundering are motives for a significant share of outward FDI from some transition economies. 
We discuss various channels for illicit capital flows to show how outward FDI can 
facilitate money laundering and some forms of capital flight. We stress here and elsewhere in the 
paper that the thrust of our argument is not that the FDI flows in and of themselves represent a 
quantitatively important way of moving illicit funds from one country to another. Rather, our 
point is that establishing businesses in foreign countries through FDI is a way of facilitating 
more traditional ways of moving illicit money overseas. These traditional ways include over- and 
under-invoicing, fictitious payments for services and phony financial transactions between parent 
firms and their foreign affiliates.  The setting up of affiliates overseas to facilitate these more 
traditional ways of moving money offshore has a significant impact on bilateral FDI flows.  
In order to test our hypothesis we specify and estimate an econometric model of outward 
FDI flows from a sample of transition economies. This model analyzes FDI from two different 
perspectives: first the investor’s decision in which host country to invest, and, second, the 
decision on the amount to invest in.   Four main conclusions flow from our estimates, and these 
support our hypothesis that illegal capital flight and money laundering lie behind an important 
part of the outward FDI of the transition economies.  First, there is a higher probability that 
transition-economy-based investors will choose to invest in a host country that is a money 
laundering center than in a host country that is not. Second, traditional drivers of FDI are able to 
explain FDI flows from transition economies when the host countries are not money laundering 
centers, but, third, these same variables are less able to explain FDI outflows to host countries 
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that are money laundering centers.  Fourth, we estimate that around 6-10% of the total FDI from 
our sample of home countries is caused by capital flight and money laundering. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows.  In Section II, we provide some background 
for our methodology. In Section III, we provide an overview of FDI from transition economies.  
Section IV contains our FDI model and the empirical results, and in section V we present 
robustness check for our estimates to ensure that they are not the result other factors that may 
affect FDI decisions but that are not included in our base specification.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Money Laundering, Capital Flight and the Foreign Investment Decision 
This section is divided into two parts that set out the factual background and theoretical 
basis for our work. In Part A we briefly review the links between the theory of the MNC and the 
way in which that theory has influenced general equilibrium specifications of bilateral FDI flows 
between countries. Part B looks at the literature on capital flight and money laundering, which, 
we argue, serve as potentially important alternative drivers of FDI but that are generally not 
considered by traditional theories of FDI. It also suggests ways of incorporating the insights and 
findings of the literature on capital flight and money laundering an explanation of how these 
motives give rise to FDI outflows. 
A. Driving Forces of Outward Foreign Investment 
The literature explaining the existence of FDI generally ascribes such activity to two 
motives. One is the firm’s desire to serve foreign markets in the presence of trade frictions 
(Markusen, 1984), which it does through so–called horizontal investment,  and the other, vertical 
investment,  is the firm’s desire to locate operations in a foreign country in order to obtain access 
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to low priced non-tradable or hard-to-trade inputs (Helpman, 1984).2  A good deal of the 
empirical work on aggregate, as opposed to firm-level, FDI flows between countries has been 
based on variations of the gravity equation  (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003) known as the knowledge-capital (KK) model of MNC activity that encompasses 
both of the main theories of FDI. The model emphasizes absolute and relative country size,  
bilateral trade costs,  relative factor endowment and investment cost differences as key drivers of 
FDI.  Carr et al. (2001) and Blonigen et al. (2003) suggest that endowment differences and 
country size to should be interacted in the KK specification and Egger and Winner (2006) 
suggest that interaction between distance and relative factor endowments is also appropriate. 
Specifications of the KK model often include additional variables such as tax policies and 
political risk that are specific to the FDI process.3  Given the demonstrated ability of the KK 
model to explain bilateral FDI flows well, we use it in this paper. 
B.  Other Motives for FDI: Capital Flight and Money Laundering. 
In the foregoing discussion of FDI, the MNC’s motives for FDI rested on the desire to 
take advantage of the profit-enhancing opportunities offered by the decision to locate abroad. But 
there are other motives as well. One is the cross-country movement of capital to reflect 
differences in the risks and returns that investors face in home and host countries, leading to 
capital flight. In some transition economies, weak or uncertain property rights may be important 
2 See Navaretti and Venables (2004) for a review of the extensive literature since the publication of these 
two articles.  
3 Blonigen (2005) provides an argument for including such additional variables in the gravity equation 
specification as well as a discussion of the gravity equation’s shortcomings.   
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drivers of capital flight.4  Much capital flight is legal, but if the home country has capital 
controls, or if investment abroad facilitates tax evasion, such movements of capital are illegal. 
The other motive is the desire to use FDI to facilitate the movement of money from one country 
to another in order to disguise its origins in illegal activity, commonly called money laundering 
(Reuter and Truman, 2004).  
Although the two phenomena are conceptually distinct, both motivate FDI flows that are 
unrelated to the traditional drivers of FDI.  Legal flight capital often takes the form of portfolio 
and other short-term investments made through normal financial channels. The option of 
portfolio investment abroad, if legal, is attractive because portfolio investments are much more 
liquid. Nevertheless, portfolio investment may be unappealing or not possible because the returns 
are often quite low or because, if the home country imposes capital controls, portfolio investment 
abroad may be illegal. Consequently, illegal capital flight is often, by intention and by its covert 
nature, not recorded in the balance of payments and has to be estimated in various ways.  
4 Kant (2002), Hermes and Lensink (2001), Khan and Haque (1985) and Schineller (1993)    
argue that risks related to the instability and lack of transparency of property rights, excessive taxation, 
corruption and weak contract enforcement and the like encourage capital flight, and also show the same 
for uncertainty about institutions, including property rights.  Some of these concerns clearly exist in 
several of the transition economies in our sample, but perhaps the clearest example of the risk of 
expropriation driving large capital flows both in and out of a transition economy is the case of Russia, 
where the property rights of the so-called oligarchs have came under sharp attack from the Putin and 
Medvedev regimes, a development long expected by knowledgeable observers and, of course, by the 
oligarchs themselves. As a result, Russia has experienced significant capital flight as well as significant 
inward FDI, often from the same countries to which Russian capital flees. Russian oligarchs protect 
themselves against expropriation by moving money overseas, but because their oligopolistic position on the Russian 
market gives them the opportunity to earn large returns on their domestic investments, they set up foreign 
corporations that invest in Russia while providing the protection of anonymous “foreign” ownership for the assets 
thus invested. For example, Cyprus is both a major destination for capital from Russia as well as one of the leading 
sources of FDI into Russia.  See Weintrobe (1998), Grigoryev and Kosarev (2000) and Kadochnikov (2005). 
 
8 
 
                                                 
Channels for illegal capital flows include unreported movements of money abroad by carrying 
large amounts of cash on trips, using couriers to carry cash, hiding cash in freight or the post, and 
over- and under-invoicing of international trade transactions.5  FDI becomes an attractive vehicle 
for facilitating the movement of funds offshore because it is less likely to be restricted than is 
portfolio investment, because the investor can hope to earn a more attractive return through FDI 
and because, as we argue below, FDI facilitates the international movement of large amounts of 
money. 6 
What illegal capital flight and money laundering have in common is the desire of the 
investor to hide his or her connection to the funds being moved and the need to move the funds 
through unrecorded, and often illegal, channels. For large sums of money, establishing affiliates 
overseas through FDI is a relatively safe and cost-effective way of meeting both these objectives. 
FDI facilitates illicit flows in three conceptually separate ways. First, the establishment of 
foreign firms constitutes a movement of money from the home country to the host country that in 
itself may constitute the transfer of illicit funds abroad. The second, and more important in terms 
of the amount of money moved offshore, way in which FDI facilitates illicit international money 
flows lies in the ability of the foreign affiliate to internalize, and thus lower, the transactions 
costs of moving illicit funds between the home country and the host country in which the affiliate 
is domiciled through channels such as under- or over-invoicing, false payments for services, 
5 Clearly, not all over- or under-invoicing transactions should be regarded as illegal money flows since 
some of those transactions simply exploit tax differences between countries in which the transactions take place. We 
return to this point in Section V. 
6 Countries typically remove restrictions on FDI flows before liberalizing portfolio capital flows. 
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phony capital injections and loans, etc. Third, FDI may “legitimize” an investors’ assets of 
dubious origin in the home country by establishing a bona fide corporate presence of the investor 
in the host country. The establishment of physical presence abroad through FDI will 
fundamentally strengthen the investor’s ownership of the assets by putting them under the 
protection of a foreign legal system or bilateral investment treaty. Examples of this are 
investments of Russian or Thai oligarchs into British soccer.7    
The motives for money laundering are typically somewhat different from those that 
motivate illegal capital flight because the existence of money laundering derives directly from 
the need to disguise the illegal origins of the money being laundered and not from differences in 
the domestic and foreign risk-return nexus. Nonetheless, the problems faced by money 
launderers and those engaging in illegal capital flight as well as the means for facilitating their 
efforts are similar. Criminal activity such as drug dealing, prostitution, fraud, bribery of public 
officials and various economic crimes generates large amounts of cash income. In order to use 
the financial system to hold and move this money and to use the money to make legitimate 
financial transactions without arousing the suspicion of the authorities, the criminals must 
launder the money, that is, make it take the form of legitimate income so that the authorities are 
unable to identify its criminal origins. In the case of petty criminals, the main objective is not to 
arouse suspicion by holding excessively large amounts of cash or making large cash deposits in 
bank accounts. Setting up multiple bank accounts and using surrogates and false identities to 
7 This form of FDI seems to have become a widespread practice. For example, recent dispatches from the 
US embassy in Sofia, as reported by the Western press quoting documents published by Wikileaks, link the 
ownership of all major Bulgarian soccer teams to foreign investors with a record of criminal activities.   
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establish numerous bank accounts are ways of keeping illicit incomes out of the purview of law 
enforcement authorities (Buchanan, 2004).  
As the amount of money needing to be laundered becomes larger, such amateurish money 
laundering schemes become too cumbersome to operate effectively as well as too vulnerable to 
discovery. To handle larger amounts of illegally obtained income, criminals may start 
businesses, especially businesses that have large part of their revenues and expenditures in the 
form of cash. Restaurants and retail establishments are particularly attractive because their large 
cash revenues and their deposits of cash in banks are less likely to attract attention and also 
because their financial records are easily falsified (Reuter and Truman, 2004, Ch. 3). In this way 
the money to be laundered can be reported as the cash revenue of, for example, a criminally-
owned restaurant, thus turning money obtained through criminal activity into seemingly 
legitimate profits.  
If the amount of money to be laundered is really large, then such local business schemes 
will also arouse the suspicions of authorities as their reported income begins to exceed the 
amount of legitimate business they can reasonably be expected to do. At this point, money 
launderers often turn to foreign banks and businesses. For example, they can use surrogates to 
deposit the money into the financial system of a foreign country. Firms engaged in international 
trade and financing are also attractive vehicles for laundering money because moving the money 
to a foreign location and then bringing it back to the country of origin further disguises its 
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criminal origins.8 Shell companies that engage in international trade can disguise the movement 
of such money through over- or under-invoicing or by means of fictional transactions in services, 
loans, capital transfers, royalties and intra-company payments, and this is thought to be a major 
mechanism for illegal capital flight and money laundering.9 For example, de Boyrie et al. (2005) 
examined unit values in US-Russian trade and estimated that over- and under-invoicing 
accounted for the movement of $1.01 to $4.85 billion per year between the two countries in the 
1990s.10  
Simpson (2005) reports that money launderers from Russia often set up shell companies 
in the United States, citing as an example ABN Amro’s transfer of over $1 billion of Russian 
money in one year to a shell company in Kentucky. This company has no physical presence in 
the United States, and it belongs to an individual thought to be associated with Russian “business 
circles”. Moreover, the same individual has incorporated nearly 200 other companies in 
Kentucky and many more in other United States jurisdictions.  In view of the high levels of 
corruption and criminality reported in some transition economies, we should expect that 
criminals there would also make similar use of foreign subsidiaries and affiliates to launder 
money and to move it outside their home countries.  
8 The fictional Mafia “godfather”, Don Corleone, owned an olive oil importing business to facilitate the 
laundering of illegal income (Puzo, 1983). 
9 Hines and Rice (1994) survey the ways in which parents and affiliates can move funds from one country 
to another. 
 
10 Because money laundering is hard to identify, even legitimate business may be caught up in it. Between 
$7 and $16 billion of Russian capital flight was allegedly laundered through The Bank of New York between 1996 
and 1999. Much of this money was allegedly the proceeds of criminal activity in Russia, and some of it was said to 
be looted IMF loans to that country. See Simpson (2005). 
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The literature on illegal capital flight and money laundering provides few linkages 
between these phenomena and FDI, although there is a related literature on the use of tax havens 
by MNCs that provides some useful insights.11 Which means of laundering money or engaging 
in illegal capital flight will be utilized depends in part on home and host country characteristics 
and in part on the amount of money an individual or organization seeks to launder. Different 
techniques for laundering money entail different fixed costs, and each implies a different 
relationship between the amount of money being laundered and the costs of money laundering, 
which include both the “direct” costs of operating the laundering scheme as well as the risk of 
apprehension, confiscation of the money laundered and other assets as well as incarceration upon 
discovery by the authorities.12 The penalties for being caught laundering money can be quite 
high; the launderer can lose not only the money being laundered through a single account but 
also the money deposited in all other similar accounts (Reuter and Truman, 2004, pp. 69-70) as 
well as other assets, and he/she will be liable for criminal prosecution for money laundering and 
possibly also for the criminal activity that generated the illicit income being laundered.  
Domestic money laundering schemes, such as those that use multiple bank accounts, even 
if serviced by surrogates,  often face sharply increasing costs because of potential discovery by 
home country officials, especially if the country is small and has only a few banks. The use of 
multiple foreign bank accounts in one or more foreign countries with money transferred to 
service these accounts entails less risk of large cash deposits in the accounts drawing suspicion, 
11 See Desai et al. (2006) for a model of the effect of tax havens on MNC investment decisions. We return 
to the relationship between tax havens and money laundering centers later. 
12 Another cost is bribing bank personnel, law enforcement officials, etc.  
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but it entails higher variable costs for transporting cash to these accounts through couriers, etc.13 
Setting up arrangements for moving money to foreign accounts through over- and under-
invoicing with foreign firms requires a higher fixed investment to establish the scheme. 
Nevertheless, as the amount of money being laundered though such schemes increases, the risk 
of discovery by the authorities also increases, possibly quite rapidly both due to home- and 
foreign-country efforts to limit tax evasion through over- and under-invoicing. Thus, money 
launderers must resort to more complex schemes to avoid discovery. Of these, FDI potentially 
entails the highest fixed cost, that of establishing and operating a firm overseas, but it is also the 
arrangement that offers the lowest marginal costs of moving large amounts of money because 
these movements can be disguised through a variety of intra-firm transactions between the parent 
firm and the foreign affiliate as described above. 
The growing number of offshore corporations with seemingly no legitimate business 
purpose confirms that illicit flows increasingly make use of firms established abroad for that 
purpose. For example, Buchanan (2004) reports that the number of shell companies in the British 
Virgin Islands, a reputed center for money laundering, had increased from 5,000 in the mid-
1980s to more than 120,000 in 1994. A characteristic of such centers is a high degree of secrecy 
offered to shareholders and the infrastructure for moving funds internationally while maintaining 
a high degree of discretion, which leads to low variable costs of laundering money.   
13 International efforts to interdict money laundering emphasize measures to limit the international 
movement of large amounts of cash. See Group of Eight (1999) and Reuter and Newman (2004). 
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Box 1 lists the host countries used in our study and notes those that international law 
enforcement organizations, described below, designate as countries where significant money 
laundering takes place. We also report for each country in our sample its corporate tax rate. A 
casual inspection of the tax rates and corruption rankings of the money laundering countries 
suggests that the picture of a money laundering country as a low-tax and corrupt jurisdiction is a 
cliché.   Many jurisdictions identified by the US Drug Enforcement Administration as money 
laundering centers are countries with high corporate taxes. They are also countries with low 
levels of corruption; among our sample of money laundering countries, Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the US  all 
were ranked among the 20 least corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International. 
What these countries do offer to foreigners seeking to launder money is political stability, ease of 
incorporation, and a banking system that undertakes many international transactions of sufficient 
volume so that the investor’s deposits and withdrawals do not attract the attention of the 
authorities.  
 III. An Overview of FDI from Transition Economies 
The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced large capital 
inflows since the start of their transitions, and the nature of these inflows and investors’ 
motivation have received considerable attention.14  More recently, firms from the transition 
economies have begun to undertake investments outside their own countries. While the stock of 
outward FDI is still no more than 15-20% of the stock of FDI in the region, the growth of these 
   14 Studies include Bevan and Estrin, 2004, Carstensen and Toubal, 2004, Brada et al. 2006. 
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flows has accelerated rapidly in this decade. Not all or perhaps even the majority of outward FDI 
from transition economies is driven by money laundering and capital flight, but a review of the 
data strongly suggests that illicit capital flight and money laundering have been important drivers 
of FDI. Their effect on the pattern of transition-economy FDI outflows is palpable even if much 
of the FDI from transition economies is driven by the existence of firms that are able to deploy 
their firm-specific competitive advantage in foreign markets through FDI financed by legal 
outflows of capital.  
One way of seeking out illicit motives for outward investment from transition economies 
is to examine the sectors into which MNCs from these countries invest. Kolotay (2004) reports 
that in five advanced transition economies, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia, the share of services in the total outward FDI stock in 2001 was 56 percent.15 Bohatá 
and Zemplinerová (2004) provide greater detail on the basis of Czech data, and they find that, at 
the end of 2000, only 13% of the stock of Czech outward FDI was in manufacturing while 77% 
was in trade and repairs, financial services and other services. Zemplinerová (forthcoming) 
reports that this pattern has continued through 2007. These studies note that the trade and repair 
sectors may represent affiliates set up aboard to service machinery and equipment exports or to 
facilitate the marketing of Czech goods. This sectoral pattern is consistent with the declared 
objectives of firms from other transition economies that undertake FDI. In a survey of investing 
firms from five transition economies, Jaklič and Svetličič (2003) found that an important  
 15 Many of the transition economies, including Russia, publish few or no statistics on either the 
sectoral or geographic composition of outward FDI.  The six countries above are the only ones for which such data 
are available for more than one year.  
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motivation for FDI was to expand foreign sales and to reduce non-labor costs, which could well 
mean distribution and marketing costs in foreign countries.16 Nevertheless, it is also possible that 
affiliates in such sectors could as well have been established to facilitate capital flight and money 
laundering.  
Like the sectoral composition of outward FDI from transition economies, the data on its 
geographic distribution are not available for all countries or for all years. In Table 1 we report the 
geographic distribution of the stock of FDI from three transition economies, Croatia, Czech 
Republic and Latvia in 2000. For the first two countries, other Central and East European 
countries are the main destination for investments. History plays an important part in explaining 
this pattern: for Croatia, the other ex-Yugoslav states make up the bulk of these investments, and 
in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia alone makes up close to 30% of Czech outward FDI 
stock. The EU is the second most important destination for FDI for these two countries, not 
surprising given its proximity and the fact that the EU is the largest trading partner of each of 
them. Surprisingly, perhaps, developing countries receive a significant share of outward FDI as 
well. In the case of Latvia developing countries dominate.  
The importance of developing countries as a destination for transition countries’ outward 
FDI is not as innocent as it appears at first glance. Using the relatively detailed Czech National 
Bank data on the distribution of Czech outward FDI by destination, we compiled Table 2, which 
shows the importance of money laundering centers as identified by the Financial Action Task 
16 Asset acquisition was not an important motive for FDI. See also Bohatá and Zemplinerová (2004) for a 
fuller discussion of the Czech case.  
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Force (FATF) in Czech outward FDI. Note the surprisingly large stock of Czech FDI located in 
Liechtenstein and the British Virgin Islands. Liechtenstein was, until 2001, listed by the FATF 
on its Non-cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) list. Interestingly, Czech FDI in 
Liechtenstein was quite significant on a flow basis up to 2000, but then disappeared entirely after 
Liechtenstein reformed its banking policies to bring them into compliance with FATF standards. 
Cyprus is a well-known center for laundering money from Russia and other East European 
countries and St. Vincent and the Grenadines continued as NCCTs after Liechtenstein’s removal 
from the list in 2000. It is hard to imagine that these countries have a great market potential for 
Czech goods or that Czech firms have some real competitive advantages in operating resorts and 
casinos on tropical islands and that these traditional factors serve as the drivers of Czech FDI to 
the Caribbean. Since the Czech Republic has a relatively good ranking among transition 
economies in ratings of  corruption, transparency and security of property rights, it is somewhat 
surprising to find that, as Table 2 shows, FDI in money laundering centers accounts for nearly 
30% of Czech outward FDI. Although we lack similarly detailed evidence for Latvia, Liuhto 
(2001) provides a number of case studies that document investments motivated by money 
laundering and capital flight. 
There are no estimates of the amount of money that is laundered by agents from the 
transition economies, but Walker (1999) estimates global money laundering to be as much as 
$2.85 trillion. According to Schneider and Windischbauer (2008), a major source of money to be 
laundered derives from illegal trafficking in drugs. They report that trade in illegal drugs is equal 
in value to nine percent of recorded world trade. Moreover, they report that in Austria and 
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Germany about 40% of money that is laundered is related to the drug trade, with the remainder 
due to illegal arms shipments (20%), economic crime (15%), theft (10%), prostitution and 
gambling (10%) and violent crimes such as armed robbery and kidnapping (5%). The relative 
importance of these sources of money needing to be laundered in transition economies may 
differ because economic crimes such as bribery, looting of firms, etc., may be more important 
that they are in Germany and Austria, but drug dealing, prostitution and human trafficking have 
been some of the well-publicized and unwelcome by-products of the transition.  
IV. A Model of FDI with Illegal Capital Flight and Money Laundering Motives 
In this section we specify and estimate a model of bilateral capital flows from our sample 
of transition economies to host countries around the world. We select a parsimonious model that 
captures the main traditional factors influencing FDI, and we add to it several variables that 
should account for the effects of capital flight and money laundering on FDI outflows from the 
sample of transition economies used in our econometric work.  Our analysis is twofold. First we 
analyze the factors that influence the FDI location choice.  Second, we investigate the principal 
determinants of the size of FDI outflows. Our results indicate that both economic factors that 
reflect the traditional drivers of FDI outflows and illicit money flows play a role in determining 
the destination of FDI outflows as well as the level of bilateral FDI flows from transition 
economies. In section V we test the robustness of our results in front of alternative nontraditional 
determinants of FDI including taxes, governance quality, wealth, infrastructure and cultural 
background and also to a different measure of money laundering.  
A. Econometric Specification  
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The first objective of our empirical analysis is to analyze FDI decisions of the investors 
in our sample of transition economies, and the effect of money laundering motives on these 
decisions. Specifically, in what we call the Location Choice Model or LC Model, we analyze 
investors’ selection of the host countries in which to invest.  We propose the following 
augmented version of the KK model to analyze FDI location choice from transition economies:  
 Location Choice Model (LC Model)  
 
 (  )ij ij ijj j ijFDI MON MONKK KKα β δ γ ε
∗ = + + + × +       Eq. 1
 
 
1   ij ijFDIpro FDIif C
∗= ≥         Eq. 2     
 0    ij ijFDIpro FDIif C
∗= <         Eq. 3     
where 
ijFDI
∗=  propensity for investors in country i to undertake FDI in country j. 
ijFDIpro = dummy variable = 1 if country j receives FDI from country i and 0 otherwise. 
ijKK =  country characteristics of countries i and j as specified by the KK model. 
jMON =  dummy variable = 1 if the host country is a money-laundering center and 0        
otherwise. 
ijε =  error term.  
ijFDI
∗ is a non-observable variable that measures the incentives for investors in country i 
to undertake FDI in country j.  Investors in country i will invest in country j only if the 
economic, social and political conditions in the two countries make the investment sufficiently 
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advantageous either from a business sense or because it facilitates illegal capital flight or money 
laundering.  If the propensity to invest is larger than the threshold value C, (  ijFDIpro C
∗ ≥ ), then 
we will observe FDI from county i to country j. We estimate the parameters of  the LC Model  
using Probit.  
The second objective of our study is to analyze the effect of money laundering on the 
volume of FDI from transition economies. Specifically, we propose a FDI Outflows Model, or 
OM model as follows: 
FDI Outflows Model (OM Model) 
  (  )ij ij ijj j ijFDI a b cMON d MONKK KK ε
∗ = + + + × +         Eq. 4
 
 
*   0ij ijijFDI FDI FDIif
∗= >         Eq. 5     
 0    ij ijFDIpro FDIproif C
∗= ≤         Eq. 6 
Equation 4 in the OM Model is defined exactly as Equation 1 of the Location Choice 
Model; however, ijFDI  in Equation 5 is the observed FDI outflow from home country i to host 
country j. Specifications such as the OM model have been widely used in the literature on 
foreign direct investment, and it is used by Carr et al. (2001) to test the KK model. The OM 
model is estimated as a Tobit model. 
B. FDI and KK Model Data  
We compiled FDI outflows by country of destination for six transition economies, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia and Slovenia. The data came from 
each country’s central bank web site. Flows are reported in US dollars. Because of the 
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infrequency of some of these FDI flows, we cumulated the value of bilateral FDI flows from 
these transition economies for the period 2000-2003. Our data are limited to these six transition 
economies because their central banks are the only ones among transition economies to report 
their FDI outflows fully by country of destination.17 Our data show that there are no bilateral 
FDI outflows between numerous home and host country pairs. Specifically, 62% of the FDI 
flows in our sample are zero. In order to analyze the FDI location decision between a pair of 
countries, the dependent variable is set equal to 1 if there is an FDI flow between the two 
countries and to zero if there is no flow.  
Most country economics variables were taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM. Although we cumulated the dependent variable over a four-
year period, the explanatory variables refer to 2002, thus centering the explanatory variable over 
the period under observation. We were unable to obtain explanatory-variable data for some of 
the host countries, and these were dropped from our sample. Our largest sample includes an 
unbalanced panel of 83 host countries and six home countries with a total of 449 observations. 
This sample includes all OECD countries and as many of the transition economy and developing 
country hosts for which data were available.  
The variables in ijKK  of the LC and OM models represent the economic drivers of 
bilateral FDI flows posited by the knowledge-capital model.  According to this model, the main 
drivers of FDI are: (1) absolute and relative country size, (2) bilateral trade costs, (3) relative 
17 We chose not to construct FDI outflows from other transition economies by using host country mirror 
statistics because of the sometimes large differences that are frequently present between the values reported by home 
and host countries.  
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factor endowment differences, (4) investment costs and certain interactions between these 
variables.   
Country size is measured by GDP. The larger the home and the host countries' GDPs, the 
larger should be country i’s FDI flows to country j. In part, this is because a large host-country 
domestic market creates opportunities for capturing economies of scale and scope that promote 
the exploitation of firm-specific competitive advantages based on R&D, branding and the finer 
subdivision of production. We do note that, in some cases, a small home-country market may be 
a factor that forces firms to seek large foreign markets precisely to achieve these economies, but 
a small country is likely to have only a few firms able to undertake such a strategy. A larger host-
country GDP attracts FDI because the costs of undertaking FDI are to some extent fixed, and 
thus investors will find larger host countries more profitable if they wish to expand sales at the 
least cost. Large economies are also likely to have a greater variety of specialized factors of 
production and resources that the foreign investor will find attractive.  
Following Egger and Winner (2006) and Carr et al. (2001) we use the following variables 
to control for relative country size: 
2 22 1 ( / ) ( / )
ij i j
ij i ij i ij
SUM GDP GDP
GDP GDP SUM GDP SUM
= +
 = − −   
where iGDP  and jGDP are gross domestic product of the home and host countries for 2002 in 
billions of 1995 US$ respectively. GDP data was obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 2ijGDP  represents the difference in bilateral country size, a measure of 
size similarity. We include this variable because, according to the KK model, affiliate sales 
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volume has an inverted U-shaped relationship to differences in country size (see Carr et al.,2001 
and Egger and Winner, 2006). 
The second set of drivers of FDI according to the KK model is home and host country 
trade costs.  We use its imports as percentage of GDP of the host country as a measure of host 
country trade costs such as tariffs, and we refer to this variable as jTChost .  For the case of home 
country trade costs we use home country external balance of goods and services for 2002 and 
refer to this variable as iTChom . Higher trade costs in the host country should stimulate FDI, as 
foreign firms will seek to serve the market through affiliates rather than through trade. Higher 
trade costs in the home country will make resource-seeking FDI less attractive for home country 
firms because they will find it more difficult to import components, parts and finished goods 
from foreign affiliates into the home country.  
The existence of international factor endowment differences is an important motive for 
FDI (Helpman 1984; Markusen and Maskus 2002; Carr et al. 2001). Following Egger and 
Winner (2006) we control for factor endowment differences using the absolute value of the 
differences between home and host countries per capita GDPs: 
1 jiij
i j
GDPGDPSK abs
POP POP
 
= −  
   
As an alternative measure of differences in skill endowments we use the differences 
between home and host countries values in the Human Development Index (HDI).  The HDI has 
been published since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme in their Human 
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Development Reports. The HDI aims to provide a broader characterization of “development” by 
aggregating  country-level attainments in life expectancy and education as well as income.  
Our measure of skill endowment differences, based on the HDI, is defined as follows: 
 2ij i jSK HDI HDI= −
 
 
The HDI does not include observations for 12 host countries, which reduces our sample from 
449 to 375 observations, so we report regressions results with and without this measure.  
According to the KK model the cost of investing in the affiliate country should measure 
host countries perceived impediments to investment.  As a proxy for investment cost we use the 
Economic Freedom of the Word Index (EFWI) for 2002, developed by the Fraser Institute and 
we refer to this measure as jICHost .  According to the Fraser Institute, the  EFWI measures the 
degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom, by 
summarizing countries' information from five broad areas:  (1) size of government, (2) legal 
structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade 
internationally and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business.  The EFWI lacks data for 15 of 
our host countries, so our data set is reduced to 340 observations when we include this variable, 
and consequently we report results with and without it. 
Finally, following Carr et al. (2001), we also incorporate a measure of distance. The role 
of distance between countries is ambiguous. On one hand, FDI is used to overcome high 
transportation costs for low-value bulky goods or for non-tradable services, and in this case 
distance between the home and host countries has a positive effect on FDI. On the other hand, 
proximity also has a positive effect on FDI because proximity implies similar tastes and 
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consumption patterns, promoting FDI used to increase sales in the host country. The literature on 
FDI suggests that not only is proximity a driver of FDI, but that adjacency of the home and host 
countries is also a particularly important stimulus to FDI. Consequently, in our model we use 
both distance and adjacency as separate explanatory variables so that:  
ijDIST  = distance in thousands of km between the capitals of countries i and j 
ijADJ  = 1 if countries i and j are adjacent, 0 otherwise 
Carr et al. (2001), also suggest incorporating interaction terms in order to capture 
possible non-linear relations between the variables. Given the available data and including the 
interaction  terms suggested by Carr et al. (2001), we estimate three versions of the KK variables 
for the LC and OM models  as follows: 
,1 ( 1 , , , 2 , , )ij ij ij ij ij ij j iKK SK ADY DIST SUM GDP TChost TChom=  
 
22 ( 1 , 2 , ( )* 2 , * 2 )ij ij ij i j ij ijKK KK SK GDP GDP SK TChost SK= −  
3 ( 2 , )ij ij jKK KK IChost=  
We employ the complete sample (449 observations) when we use 1ijKK  in our models, 
but, due to missing observations for skill endowment differences ( 2ijSK ) and the cost of 
investing in the affiliate country ( jIChost ), we have only 375 and 340 observations respectively 
when we use 2ijKK  and 3ijKK .  Note that the 3ijKK  specification includes all variables and 
interactions terms used by Carr et al. (2001) in their empirical test of the KK model. 
C. Money Laundering Countries  
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An important issue for our study is the identification of money laundering countries. We 
define a country as a money laundering center if it is listed as a “jurisdiction of primary concern” 
in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2003 of the US Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The counties identified as money 
laundering our sample, listed in Box 1, are such “jurisdictions of primary concern”. This 
category includes "all countries and other jurisdictions whose financial institutions engage in 
transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from all serious crime" (The Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes section of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
2003, page XII-68).  An important advantage of this way of categorizing money laundering 
countries is that the countries included in the list have significant inflows of illicit money and not 
just weak regulatory systems. The US Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs explicitly notes that "the focus of analysis in considering whether a country or 
jurisdiction should be included in this category is on the significance of the amount of proceeds 
laundered, not of the anti-money laundering measures taken." (The Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes section of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003, page XII-
68).  We believe that this is a superior categorization to that of the Financial Action Task Force’s 
(FATF) list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT), which focuses on a 
jurisdiction’s compliance with stated criteria regarding its legal and regulatory framework, 
international cooperation, and resources devoted to preventing money laundering.   
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and other 
countries have devoted extensive resources to reduce terrorist financing. Identification and 
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control of money laundering is critical part of this effort due to the close link between money 
laundering and terrorist financing.   In view of the extensive research and resources devoted to 
the collection and analysis of a wide range of information used to produce the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, we believe that the list of countries identified as money 
laundering centers in this report is the most complete, up-to-date and accurate available.18  
The report is produced through collaboration and information sharing  involving the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the US Department of the Treasury, as a 
member of the international Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units,  but other agencies 
involved in the preparation of the report include the U.S. Customs Service, the Internal Revenue 
Service, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Technical Assistance, the 
Office of Foreign Asset Control, the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering 
Section, the Counterterrorism Section,  the Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and 
Training Office, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve Board. The 
information used to prepare the report is accessible only to government officials. The basis for 
these activities is the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October 2001. The Act revises key elements 
of the criminal code and Bank Secrecy Act to provide Unites States officials access to 
information critical to identifying money laundering activities. 
Based on the list of money laundering countries described in this section, we create the 
dummy variable, MONj, which is equal to one if the host country is a money-laundering center 
18 Nevertheless, in Section V we also consider an alternative scheme for identifying countries that are 
money laundering centers. Use of this alternative categorization does not change our conclusions.  
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and to zero otherwise.  We also include interaction terms between the KK variables and the 
money laundering dummy. While outward FDI motivated by economic forces is likely to be 
influenced by the economic characteristics of the host and home countries as measured by the 
variables suggested by the KK model,  this should not be the case for FDI motivated by capital 
flight and money laundering. For example, investors seeking to make investments to facilitate 
money laundering are more interested in the host countries’ laws and financial regulations than 
in their size or economic potential. Indeed, the effect of the traditional economic variables should 
be smaller for FDI to money laundering countries, and the interactive slope dummy variables 
will capture these differences.  
D. Estimation Results for the  Location Choice Model 
The first objective of our empirical study is to evaluate the effect of money laundering in 
the location choice decisions. As explained before, our empirical strategy consists first in 
identifying a parsimonious model that captures the main traditional factors influencing FDI and 
then add to it variables that should account for the effects of money laundering.   Given data 
availability, we estimate three specifications of the KK model, using the previously described 
variables 1ijKK , 2ijKK  and 3ijKK . The set of variables 3ijKK  is the most complete one, and 
includes all variables proposed by Carr et al. (2001).  However, given missing observations for 
skill factor endowments differences and host country investment costs, our estimation using 
3ijKK  is based on 340 observations. The set of variables in 2ijKK  does not include a measure of 
host country investment cost, increasing the number of observations to 375. Finally we use the 
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complete sample, 449 observations, with the set 1ijKK , but no measures of skill factor differences 
are included in this specification. 
We estimate the FDI Location Choice Model using each one of the three specifications of  
the KK model variables as only regressors in a standard Probit regression. We refer to these three 
models as LC-KK1, LC-KK2, LC-KK3 models.  The depended variable is the dichotomous 
variable ijFDIpro  as described in Equations (2) and (3), so in this case we analyze FDI location 
choice as the probability that there will be FDI between a pair of countries. Estimation results for 
the three versions of the KK model are presented in the first three columns of Table 3. We report 
the variables’ marginal effects evaluated at the mean and their corresponding p-values also 
evaluated at the mean19.  The signs of all estimated coefficients are consistent with theory. 
Higher GDPs in the home and host country increase the probability that FDI between the two 
countries will take place. This is reflected in the positive coefficients of SUM and GDP2, 
although only SUM is significant in all three cases.  The coefficient for factor endowment 
differences, as measured by 1ijSK  is not significant in our regressions.
20 However, skill 
differences measured by 2ijSK  , the measure of differences in the human development index, are 
significant and positive, reflecting the proclivity of the host countries to invest in developing 
countries whose development index is lower than theirs.  
19 The marginal effects for the interacted variables were estimated following Ai and Norton (2003). We 
thank an anonymous referee for bringing our attention to this issue.  
20 Egger and Winner (2006) also find an insignificant effect on FDI using SK1; they include interaction 
terms of SK with SUM and GDP2 that are significant. We refrain for using such interaction terms because they 
cause high multi-colinearity due to the cross sectional nature of our study. We do include interactions effects when 
SK2 is included in the specification.  
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Adjacency also significantly increases the probability of FDI, and greater distance 
between the two countries reduces the likelihood of FDI. These results are consistent across all 
three KK model regressions. We do not find evidence of the importance of bilateral trade costs, 
as  jTChost and iTChom  are not significant in our regressions. This is consistent with the results 
of Carr et al. (2001).   The investment cost of host country, jIChost  which is just included in the 
third regression, is not statistically significant. Finally none of the interacted variables included 
in the model are significant, which suggests that the effects of the KK variables on FDI in our 
sample are conditionally constant. 
The second step is to analyze the effect of Money Laundering on FDI location decisions, 
so we add the money laundering dummy jMON   to our models. We also include interaction 
terms between the KK variables and the money laundering dummy as defined in Equation (1).  
In order to keep our model parsimonious and to avoid multicollinearity issues, we only include 
the statistically significant variables from the previously estimated KK models. Specifically, in 
Table 3 we present estimation results for two versions of the LC model with money laundering:  
first with the significant variables of 1ijKK ( LC-KK1+ML model in column 4) and then with the 
significant variables of 2ijKK ( and LC-KK2+ML in column 5).  We do not report results using 
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the variables on 3ijKK  since they only differ from 2ijKK  by Investment Cost of the host 
country ( ijIChost ), which is not significant.
21 
The marginal effects reported in Table 3 show that the coefficients for ijADY  and ijDISt   
are very similar to the LC-KK models results. The coefficient for the money laundering dummy 
is positive and significant in both specifications LC-KK1+MN and LC-KK2+MN. The effect for 
skill factor differences is also significant and almost identical to the models without money 
laundering. The marginal effects of ijSUM  increases to 0.47 in LC-KK1+MN and to 0.60 in LC-
KK2+MN models when compared with LC-KK1 and LC-KK2 models respectively. The 
marginal effect of the interaction ij ijSUM MON×  is negative and is the only significant 
interacted variables. Based on these results we can conclude: 
1. On average, money laundering countries have a 20% higher probability of receiving 
FDI after we control for the traditional drivers of FDI contained in the KK model. 
2. The horizontal investment components of the KK model, i.e., the effects of larger 
market size, measured by ijSUM , is less important to the decision to invest in money 
laundering countries.  
3. The vertical investment components of the KK model, i.e., the effects of differences 
in home and host country factor endowments, are equally important for FDI location 
in both money-laundering countries and non-money-laundering countries. 
21 We also do not include the interaction with ij ijMON DIS× to avoid multicollinearity given the cross-
sectional nature of our data.  This variable is not significant in our estimation. 
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E. Estimation Results for the  FDI Outflows Model 
The second objective of our study is to evaluate the effect of money laundering in the 
volume of FDI outflows.  Our estimations results are based on a Tobit regression for the OM 
model as described in Equations (4) to (6).22  We follow the same estimation strategy as in the 
Location Choice Model presented in the previous section, that is first we identify a parsimonious 
model that captures the main traditional factors influencing FDI (models OM-KK1, OM-KK2, 
and OM-KK3) and then add to it variables that should account for the effects of  money 
laundering (models OM-KK1+ML and OM-KK2+ML).   
Marginal effects for the Tobit estimation results of the OM model with the three 
specifications of the KK variables are reported in first three columns of Table 4 (OM-KK1, OM-
KK2, and OM-KK3).  The signs and statistical significance of the coefficients for the three 
specifications of the KK model  are consistent with the probit results reported in Table 3. All 
coefficients of the three specifications of the KK model are consistent with theory.  Market size, 
proxied by SUM, is positive and significant.  The variables DIST and ADY are also significant 
with negative and positive effects respectively.  As before,   factor endowment differences 
measured by SK1 are not significant, but when they are measured by SK2 they are positive and 
significant.  As in the probit case, we find no significant effect of bilateral trade costs nor of 
investment cost, and none of the interacted variables in the three KK models is significant.  
22 We also estimated this model using a Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman 1979) to control for 
sample selection. Results are qualitatively similar to the ones using the Tobit model . Given that in the Heckman 
model we use a very similar set of regressors in the estimation equation and selection equation we believe that the 
Tobit regression results are more reliable. Results for the Heckman selection model are available from the authors.  
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Next, we estimate the model including our ijMON  dummy variable and the 
corresponding interaction terms in addition to the significant variables of the KK models. 
Intuitively, if the money laundering dummy is significant and positive, then, on average, FDI 
flows to a money-laundering country are larger compared to those to an identical country that is 
not a money laundering center.   Similarly, significant coefficients for the interaction terms will 
imply different effects of the KK variables for FDI directed to money laundering countries.  
The estimation results reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 (OM-KK1+ML and OM-
KK2+ML models) corroborate these hypotheses. The money laundering dummy is greater than 
zero at 5% significance level.  The effect of ADY on FDI is different for money laundering 
countries as its corresponding interaction terms is significant.  The interaction term for 
ij ijSUM MON×  is significant only if skill differences are included in the model. The pseudo R-
square coefficient increases from 0.0286 in the OM-KK1 model to 0.0367 in the OM-KK1+ML 
model and from 0.0356 to 0.0430 from the OM-KK2 to the OM-KK2+ML models. 
 Results presented in Table 4 show that the KK variables are significant when FDI is 
directed to host countries that are not money laundering centers.  In the case of FDI directed to 
money laundering countries, the effect of the variables suggested by the KK model is 
substantially smaller.  The only exception is the skill endowment differences, which has the same 
significant effect for both groups of host countries.  We conclude that the volume of FDI 
outflows is well explained by the KK model when these flows are directed to countries that are 
not money laundering centers. However, the explanatory power of the KK with respect to the 
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volume of FDI outflows to money laundering countries is significantly less because the latter 
flows are motivated by other factors, the nature of which remains the subject of future research.  
Finally, in Table 5, we provide a measure of the importance of FDI motivated by illicit 
money flows by relating it to total outward FDI from our sample of home countries.   Panel A of 
Table 5 reports the amount of FDI that goes to host countries that we identify as money 
launderers as well as the amount of FDI as a percentage of total outward FDI by the home 
countries. The latter ranges from 11.6% for Estonia to a high of 80.7% for Bulgaria, and the 
average for our sample of host countries is 28.89%. Thus FDI to money-laundering countries 
accounts for a significant proportion of outward FDI from our sample of home countries.  
Of course, not all investment going to money laundering host countries consists of illicit 
flows from the home countries because there are legitimate reasons for directing FDI to these 
hosts as well. Thus in Panel B we report our estimates of the share of FDI going to money 
laundering hosts that is motivated by illicit flows. We obtain these estimates by using the 
parameter estimates for FDI flows to non-money laundering countries to estimate the amount of 
FDI that we would expect from each home country to each money-laundering host if that host 
county were a “normal” country rather than a money launderer. The parameters used for the 
estimation are the ones presented in Table 4 for the model including skill endowment differences 
(OM-KK2+ML).23   For our sample of home countries, we estimate that, on average,  21% of 
FDI to money laundering countries consists of FDI intended to facilitate illicit money flows. 
Thus, an appropriate model of FDI for these host countries clearly would have to be specified in 
23 In order to make our results conservative, we present our calculations assuming that the countries are not 
adjacent.  
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a way that accounted for FDI intended to facilitate illicit flows as a determinant of the volume 
and location of total FDI.  
The dollar amount of FDI going to money laundering host counties, reported in Panel C, 
is obtained by multiplying the first row of Panel A by the corresponding percentage in Panel B of 
Table 5, and in the last column we relate this illicit-flow-promoting FDI to total FDI outflows 
from each home country. The highest share of FDI meant to facilitate illicit flows in total FDI is 
17.06% for Macedonia and the lowest is less than 5.23% for Estonia. We estimate that about 6% 
of FDI from the sample of home countries appears to be motivated by the desire to promote 
illicit financial flows, significant enough as a proportion to warrant this inclusion of illicit capital 
flows  in models of outward FDI.   
V. Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks 
In this section we evaluate the robustness of the results of our model of FDI.  As 
described in Section II, the benchmark model we use to analyze FDI is the knowledge-capital 
(KK) model.  Our results imply that the KK model is not able to explain completely the FDI 
inflows for the host countries in our sample, and we showed that an important part of the 
unexplained FDI is motivated by the desire to facilitate illicit financial flows. In this section we 
assess the robustness of our findings by considering other factors that might also, theoretically, 
also influence FDI outflows and whose omission might have biased our estimates.24 Our analysis 
focuses in five alternative drivers of FDI suggested by the literature on multinational firms: 
differences in home- and host-country tax rates, the special appeal for foreign investors of host 
24 Such other motives are often modeled as being part of the “resistance” variable represented in our model 
by the distance between home and host country. 
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countries that are tax havens, differences in home- and host-country levels of governance, 
differences in the economics environment such as wealth and infrastructure, and similarities in 
home and host country cultural environments.  We report results of the effects of these variables 
on our results for the FDI Outflows Model only because the effects on the Location Choice 
Model are very similar.25 Finally, we analyze the dependence of our results on money laundering 
dummy used in our estimation.  We find that our results are robust to all the alternative 
explanations for FDI and to the use of other money laundering measures.  Moreover, our 
estimate that 6% of total FDI is motivated by money laundering increases to 10% if we include 
all alternative explanations in our model. 
A. Tax differences 
Because MNCs are interested in the maximization of profits post-tax, home- and host- 
country tax rates should have an impact on location decisions. The literature on tax effects on 
FDI is extensive, and summaries can be found in the Ruding Report (see Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC) 1992), Hines (1997, 1999), Devereux and Freeman (1995) and 
 Blonigen  (2005). More recent studies analyzing the effect of tax differences on FDI include 
Buettner and Ruf (2007), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) and de Mooij and Ederveen 
(2008).  The basic idea behind all these studies is that MNCs’ location decisions are influenced 
by international differences in tax rates.  Thus we must consider the possibility that, in our 
model, part of the unexplained FDI flows that we attribute to the facilitation of illicit money 
flows could be driven by the tax regimes of the host countries.  If we failed to control for the 
25 Complete estimation results for the Location Choice Model robustness check are available from the 
authors.  
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effects of different tax regimes, our results would suffer from omitted variable bias if the 
differences in tax rates were highly correlated with the money laundering dummy as in the case 
where the countries listed as money laundering centers were also countries that had very low or 
high tax rates. 26 
To examine whether our results are driven by host-country tax rates, we construct a 
variable that measures the tax differences between home and host countries as:  
    ij i jTAX corporate tax rate corporate tax rate= −  
where the subscripts  i and j represent the home and host country respectively.  Our tax variable 
is based on the corporate tax rates in existence in 2003.
27
 If TAXij is an important driver of FDI, 
we expect it to have a positive effect on bilateral tax flows. We include the TAXij variable in the 
FDI Outflows Model that includes skill factor endowment differences (OM-KK2+ML of Table 
4) and report the results in Table 6.
28
 Table 6 includes estimated marginal effects and p-values 
for our base model (OM-KK2+ML) in the first column and results controlling for taxes in 
column 2.   
As expected, the coefficient of TAXij is positive, meaning that the lower the host country 
tax rate relative to the home country rate, the higher the FDI flows to the host country. The 
26 From Box 1 we can see that, among the countries identified as money laundering centers, several have 
relatively high corporate tax rates. 
27 We obtain the corporate tax rate from KPMG Tax rate survey 2003. Of the 84 countries in our sample, 61 
are included in this survey. For the countries not included in the KPMG survey we obtained data from a variety of 
other sources.  
28 Results for the Money Laundering Model I of Table 4 are qualitatively identical and are available from 
the authors. In unreported results we also include interaction term wit or money laundering dummy, which become 
statistically insignificant.  
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pseudo R-squared coefficient increases from 0.043 to 0.487. After including the tax proxy, the 
money laundering dummy coefficient increases in magnitude from 51.52 in our base model to 
68.60 and remains statically significant with a p-value even lower than in the base case.  These 
results imply that both low tax host countries and money laundering centers both attract FDI, but 
in different ways. We conclude that our estimates of illicit financial flows are robust and 
conservative even if we consider tax differences as an alternative determinant of FDI flows. 
 B. Tax havens  
Countries attract FDI not only because income earned locally is taxed at favorable rates, 
but also because host countries’ tax policies can facilitate the avoidance of tax payments by 
foreign-owned firms altogether.  According to the OECD, four factors identify a country as tax 
haven:29 the jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes on foreign-owned firms; there is a 
lack of transparency; laws or administrative practices in place prevent the effective exchange of 
information for tax purposes with other governments on foreign taxpayers benefiting from low or 
nonexistent taxation; and there is no requirement that the activity of the foreign-owned firm be 
substantial. Several studies have documented the importance of tax havens on FDI. For example, 
Hines and Rice (1994) show the effect of “fiscal paradises” or tax havens on US MNCs’ location 
decisions. A comprehensive analysis of tax haven countries can be found in Diamond and 
Diamond (2002), and Dharmapala and Hines (2009) explore the factors influencing whether 
countries become tax havens.  
29 See the OECD web site  http://www.oecd.org 
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As in the case of differences in tax rates, our model for FDI may lead to incorrect 
conclusions if FDI is driven by the fact that some host countries are tax havens. In order to 
control for this possibility, we include in our  FDI outflow model a dummy variable jHAVEN  
that takes the value of one if the host country is a tax haven and zero otherwise.  Our list of tax 
havens countries includes all the countries identified in Hines and Rice (1994) and Diamond and 
Diamond (2002).  We also include the countries included in the OECD's list of non-cooperative 
countries in 2000.  This list of countries is the same as used by Dharmapala and Hines (2009).30  
As before, we estimate our FDI Outflows model incorporating the tax haven variable, 
jHAVEN  into money laundering model OM-KK2-ML.
31 The results presented in Table 6, 
column 3, show that the tax haven dummy variable is not significant.  The estimated coefficients 
for the money laundering dummy remain the same after including the tax haven dummy. We 
conclude that our results are not driven by the presence of tax haven countries in our sample of 
host countries.   
C.  Differences in Governance Levels   
The quality of the host country’s regulatory system and government can also influence 
the volume of FDI intended to facilitate illicit financial flows. A well regulated country with an 
effective legal and crime prevention system is less likely to be a host for FDI that facilitates 
money laundering.  The critical issue is whether the country in question regulates inflows of 
money that originates in illegal activities or not. Some countries have highly restrictive 
30 The tax haven countries are Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Hong Kong, China, 
Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Seychelles, Singapore, and Switzerland.   
31 In unreported results we also included interaction terms that were not statistically significant.  
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regulatory systems for legal business activities but permit inflows of laundered money. Other 
countries may provide access to their markets without restrictive regulations on legal activities 
but may seek to restrict the inflow of money that originates in criminal or other illegal activities.  
A valid concern regarding our study is the fact that our model lacks a variable that controls for 
differences in regulatory system effectiveness across countries. Proponents of those differences 
suggest that such a variable could be seen as a better proxy for money laundering risk.32 
 We conjecture that the effect of regulatory differences and governance is already 
measured   by our dummy for money laundering countries.  In order to test our conjecture, we 
introduce into our regressions the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003).  
These indicators are estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and are 
based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 
25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. The six measures of 
governance are described by Kaufmann et al. (2003) are as follows: 
1. Voice and accountability (VOI): Number of indicators measuring various aspects of 
the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to 
which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. We also 
include in this category indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an 
important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions. 
32 Much of what is being said in this section about regulatory activities of countries has been subject of 
recent high level debates about international cooperation in developing controls on drug money, tax evasion, money 
supporting terrorist activities and other criminal and illegal activities. It is likely that, if those discussions were to be 
successful, they would likely affect the choice of proxies for illegal activities in our model.    
41 
 
                                                 
 2. Political stability and absence of violence (POL): Several indicators that measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by 
possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This 
index captures the idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the 
likelihood of sudden changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the continuity 
of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to peacefully select 
and replace those in power. 
3. Government effectiveness (EFF):  Measures the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The 
main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and 
implement good policies and deliver public goods. 
4. Regulatory quality (REG):  Includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business 
development. 
5. Rule of law (LAW):  Indicators which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.  
6. Control of corruption (CORRU): Measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally 
defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. Despite this straightforward focus, the 
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particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from 
the frequency of “additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of corruption on the 
business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency 
of elites to engage in “state capture”.  
All six indicator variables are measured from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores correspond to 
better outcomes.  From these indicators we construct a measure of home and host countries 
differences in governability by the absolute value of the differences on the each indicator for all 
home and host country pairs in our sample. For example, Voice and Accountability differences 
are calculated as:  ( ),ij i jVOI abs VOI VOI= −  and the other measures are similarly defined.  
Columns 4 through 9 of Table 6 reports results of our model with controls for these 
governability measures. We include the governability measures one by one due to the high 
correlation between them in our sample, but in the last column of Table 6 we also include then 
together with all the control variables used in our robustness checks.  We find that differences in 
three measures of governability are statistically significant in explaining FDI outflows. 
Specifically, the marginal effects of differences in voice and accountability (VOI), political 
stability and absence of violence (POL) and regulatory quality (REG) are negative and 
significantly different from zero. 
 A home country’s FDI is directed mostly to host countries with the same level of 
governance.  These results are consistent with the finding of Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) 
that MNCs from home countries with a low level of governance have advantages over MNCs 
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from better governed home counties when investing in host countries with low levels of 
governance because of their ability to cope with a challenging governance environment.  
Note that the regressions in Table 6 show that the estimated coefficients for the money 
laundering dummy are almost invariant after including each one of the differences in governance 
controls. This strengthens our argument that money laundering has an independent effect on FDI 
flows that is separate from the effects of differences in governance.  
D. Differences in the Economic Environment  
FDI can be also be motivated by similarities between home and host country economic 
environment and infrastructure. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) emphasizes the possible 
advantages an MNE from a poor home country can have for investing in a poor host country, 
because such MNEs have experience in meeting the needs of low income populations. Similarly, 
an MNE that has more experience working in a home country with inefficient markets or poor 
business infrastructure will have more success investing in a similar business environment. 
Based on this intuition we include unemployment (UNEMPj) as measure of the efficiency with 
which a host country’s markets function, and the number of internet connections for every 1000 
habitants (INTERj) as a measure of the host’s infrastructure.33 As in the case of the governance 
measures, we compute the absolute value of the differences between home and host countries 
and add them to our model OM-KK2+ML.  Table 6 shows marginal effects of each of the 
environmental variables. We find support for Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc’s (2008) findings for 
33 In unreported results we also included other measures of market efficiency and infrastructure, for 
example, GDP per capita and the number of phone subscribers per 1000 population; the results are qualitatively 
similar.   
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differences in countries market efficiency as a driver of FDI outflows. The coefficient on 
differences in UNEMPj is negative and significant which implies that home countries’ FDI will 
be directed toward countries of similar market efficiency. The infrastructure proxy is not 
significant. More important, the marginal effects of the money laundering dummy remain 
significant and positive, with a magnitude similar to that in the base model.  Thus we conclude 
that our conclusion derived from the main money laundering model remain valid when we 
control for differences in the economic environments.    
E. Cultural  Similarities  
MNEs are thought to be more likely to invest in countries with similar language, customs 
and general cultural background as the home country (see for example, Guiso et al., 2009; 
Shenkar, 2001). In order to capture this link in our sample, we introduce a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the home and host countries belonged to the same country in the recent 
past. Specifically our dummy ( ijCUL ) takes the value of one for  FDI flows between Czech 
Republic and Slovakia; between Slovenia  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia and 
Serbia; and between Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. Column 
12 of Table 6 reports the regression results.34 We also present results for cultural differences 
when we include all control variables discussed in this Section.   We do not find statistically 
significant evidence for the importance of cultural links in our sample, which can be explained 
by the fact that several other controls such as distance, adjacency or skill factor differences are 
34 In unreported results we also include interaction effects for our dummy variable. The results are also 
robust to the presence of these non-significant interaction effects.  
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collinear with these cultural similarities.  The effects of money laundering are robust to the 
inclusion of the cultural links variable, and even increase in magnitude.  We also used a broader 
measure of cultural similarities in the form of a dummy for historical, colonial and same-nation 
links as suggested by Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008), but this variable had even less 
explanatory power.  
F. Other Measures of Money Laundering 
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results to the use of other measures of 
money laundering. To indentify a country as money laundering country is a difficult task, since it 
involves identifying money flows that are by their nature designed to be hidden. Although we 
believe that the list of money laundering countries prepared by the International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Reports is the most accurate available, in this section we test to see whether 
alternative categorizations that have some international credibility would yield different results.   
Other measures of money laundering proposed in the literature are based on the 
identification of suspicions transactions (Levi and Gold, 1994), on surveys (UN International 
Crime Victims Surveys), on differences in money supply and money in circulation (Tanzi, 1997) 
and factor models (Schneider, 2003). However, most of the data used to compile these measures 
are difficult to obtain for a large set of countries or are relatively inaccurate estimators of money 
laundering (Walker and Unger, 2009) 
One measure of money laundering that appears to have both better country coverage and 
international credibility is the so-called Walker Model (Walker, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2003a,b). 
This model is being used, updated and improved by the IMF to measure money laundering, and 
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it has been adopted by United Nations to predict global drug money flows (see UNODC, 2005). 
The Walker index is based on an input-output model and produces a measure of a country’s 
"attractiveness to money launderers".  A potentially valuable feature of this measure is that it is 
not a zero-one dummy as used in our previous regressions, but rather a semi-continuous variable 
with higher values indicating countries with greater attractiveness for money launderers. In order 
to check the robustness of our results to different measures of money laundering, we use the 
estimates of the Walker model, reported in Walker (2003b) as our money laundering proxy.  In 
our sample, Walker’s measures range from 634 for the United States to 0-9 for countries like 
Peru, Kenya and India.  
In the last column of Table 6 we report results on the marginal effects of our Tobit model 
with money laundering, including all control variables analyzed in this robustness checks section 
but using Walkers' money laundering measure. To analyze the effects we compared the results 
presented in the last two columns of Table 6. The marginal effects for the KK model variables  
ijADJ  , ijDIST  and 2ijSK  have similar magnitude compared with the case using our money 
laundering proxy and they are all significant. The only exception is the coefficient of ijSUM  , 
which becomes both small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Walker’s money 
laundering measure is positive and significant, and the only significant interaction term is 
ij ijMON ADJ× . As expected, the magnitude of the marginal effect of Walkers' measure is 
different from the one for our zero-one money laundering dummy because the magnitude of 
Walker’s measure ranges from 634 to 5.   
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The main differences in the two regressions may be due to the fact that several of the KK  
regressors are used in the constructions of Walker's index. The best example is a country’s' 
GDP , which is used both to calculate the KK variable ijSUM  and Walker's attractiveness 
measure. This may be why ijSUM is not significant when we use Walker's measure. Moreover, in 
the model using our money laundering dummy, if we take the  coefficient of ijSUM (174.91) 
minus that of j ijMON SUM× (-162.40), the effect of ijSUM for a money laundering country 
(12.40) is similar to coefficient of ijSUM Walkers measure (17.24), and is also insignificant.   
Thus we conclude the money laundering dummy used in this paper is a robust proxy for 
money laundering activity. Moreover, results with the zero-one dummy have the advantage of 
being able to disentangle the money laundering effects from the traditional effects on FDI 
established by the KK model.  
VI. Conclusions 
We have shown that the volume and country of destination of bilateral FDI flows from 
our sample of transition economies to a broad sample of host countries are driven, in part, by 
non-economic motivations such as the desire to facilitate illegal capital flight and money 
laundering. By means of a widely-used model of bilateral FDI flows, we show that in average 
29% percent of total FDI is directed toward countries that are money laundering centers and that, 
of the FDI going to these countries, about 20% is motivated by the desire to facilitate illicit 
money flows. We have provided robustness checks to ensure that our results are not driven by 
other explanations of FDI, such as differences in tax rates, etc. that have been identified as 
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important in the literature. Anecdotal evidence and an examination of outward FDI flows from a 
sample of transition economies support our hypothesis.  
Our econometric results suggest that non-traditional determinants of FDI flows, including 
money laundering, should be integrated into the theory of foreign investment. One avenue for 
further research would be to broaden the sample of home countries beyond transition economies 
so as to generalize our findings. A second area for further work is to develop a model that 
explains the characteristics of home countries that lead to large illicit capital outflows and the 
incorporation of that model’s insights into the estimation of bilateral FDI flows.   
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 Box 1: Host Countries’ Money Laundering Status and Corporate Tax Ratesa 
 
Albania (23), Algeria (30), Argentina (35), Australia* (30), Austria* (34), Azerbaijan (22), Bahamas* 
(0), Bahrain (0,), Belarus (24), Belgium (34), Belize (25), Bosnia and Herzegovina* (30), Brazil* (34), 
Bulgaria (15), Canada* (38.6), Cayman Islands* (0), Chile (16.5), China* (33), Costa Rica* (36), Croatia (20), 
Cyprus* (10/15), Czech Republic (31), Denmark (30), Ecuador (36), Egypt(-,), Estonia (24), Finland (29), 
France* (34), Georgia (20), Germany* (40), Greece* (30), Hong Kong* (17), Hungary* (18), India* (37), 
Indonesia* (30), Iran (25), Ireland (13), Israel*(36), Italy* (38), Japan* (42), Kazakhstan (30), Kenya (30), 
Korea (30), Latvia* (15), Lebanon* (15), Liberia* (35), Liechtenstein* (15), Lithuania (15), Luxembourg* 
(30), Macedonia (10), Malaysia (28), Malta (35), Mexico* (34), Moldova (0), Mongolia (10), Netherlands* 
(32), New Zealand (33), Nigeria* (30), Norway (28), Peru (27), Philippines* (32), Poland (27), Portugal (33), 
Romania (25), Russian Federation* (24), Serbia and Montenegro (14), Seychelles (0), Singapore* (22), Slovak 
Republic (25), Slovenia (25), Spain* (35), Suriname (36), Sweden (28), Switzerland* (24), Thailand* (30), 
Turkey* (30), Ukraine* (30), United Arab Emirates* (40), United Kingdom* (30), United States* (40), 
Uruguay* (35), Uzbekistan (10), Venezuela* (34) 
 
Notes: 
a Corporate tax rates in percent for 2003 are taken from the cited Forbes and KPMG web sites. If 2003 
is not available we use the first KPMG tax data after 2003 or information from countries' central banks. These 
rates should be interpreted with caution, since the effective tax on profits also depends critically on 
depreciation allowances, tax incentives, and other rules for calculating profit.   See the text for definition of 
money laundering status. 
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TABLE 1 
 Geographic Distribution of the Stock of Outward FDI from Three 
Transition Economies   (2000) 
 
Share in total 
outward FDI stock 
(%)     Croatia 
Czech 
Rep. 
      
Latvia 
Central & East  Europe      76 58 04 
European Union     16 19 04 
Other West Europe      04 00 
Other Developed      05 01 
Cyprus      02 06 
Developing Countries     07 12 85 
Sources: Kolotay, 2004 and the countries’ National Bank web sites 
Note: May not add to 100% due to rounding. 
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TABLE 2  
Distribution of Czech Outward FDI Stock to Selected Countries in 2000 
(thousands US$  and % of total outward FDI) 
 
       
                                Money Laundering Countries       thou. $US          % 
                                                                                                
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
British Virgin Islands 45,362 6.15 
Guernsey 7,122 0.97 
Cyprus 30,847 4.18 
Liechtenstein 131,358 17.80 
Dutch Antilles 1,133 0.15 
St. Vincent & Granada 1,005 0.14 
Total 216,827 29.39 
Other Hosts   
Germany 36,839 4.99 
Austria 17,312 2.35 
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TABLE 3 
Estimation of the Location Choice Model (LC) 
 
 LC-KK1 
Model  
LC-KK2 
Model  
LC-KK3 
Model  
LC-KK1 +ML 
Model 
LC-KK2+ML 
Model 
SK1 2.62 4.22 0.53 
   (0.19) (0.08) (0.87) 
  ADY 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.45 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
DIST -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SUM 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.47 0.6 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) 
GDP2 0.15 0.19 0.32 
   (0.35) (0.30) (0.12) 
  TCHost 0.02 0.02 -0.06 
  
 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.75) 
  TCHome -1.71 1.38 0.98 
  
 
(0.64) (0.75) (0.83) 
  SK2 
 
0.52 0.49 
 
0.45 
  
(0.03) (0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
(GDPi-GDPj)*SK2 
 
-0.33 -0.39 
  
  
(0.14) (0.12) 
  TCHost * SK22 
 
-4.28 -5.88 
  
  
(0.13) (0.16) 
  ICHost 
  
0.07 
  
   
(0.16) 
  MON 
   
0.18 0.21 
    
(0.00) (0.00) 
ADY*MON 
   
-0.08 -0.15 
    
(0.33) (0.22) 
SUM*MON 
   
-0.33 -0.43 
    
(0.06) (0.04) 
SK2*MON 
    
-0.03 
     
(0.48) 
      Pseudo R2 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.11 
 
Note: We report marginal effects at the variables mean from Probit regressions and the 
corresponding p-values in parenthesis immediately after. The marginal effects for the 
interacted variables were estimated following Ai and Norton (2003).  
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TABLE 4 
Estimation of the FDI Outflows Model (OM) 
 
 OM-KK1 
Model  
OM-KK2 
Model  
OM-KK3 
Model  
OM-KK1+ML 
Model 
OM-KK2+ML 
Model 
      SK1 328.04 901.55 304.39 
   (0.55) (0.19) (0.73) 
  ADY 184.67 202.8 195.81 307.47 363.82 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
DIST -14.08 -13.36 -14.31 -15.52 -15.53 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SUM 22.23 23.56 25.67 109.88 160.12 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.04) 
GDP2 86.26 93.12 124.25 
   (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) 
  TCHost 28.42 45.46 39.66 
  
 
(0.43) (0.32) (0.47) 
  TCHome 1568.04 1861.78 1918.87 
  
 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.35) 
  SK2 
 
212.9 201.66 
 
188.17 
  
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
(GDPi-GDPj)*SK2 
 
-45.27 -58.31 
  
  
(0.38) (0.30) 
  TCHost * SK22 
 
-1532.68 -2039.28 
  
  
(0.10) (0.16) 
  ICHost 
  
7.84 
  
   
(0.55) 
  MON 
   
41.34 51.52 
    
(0.03) (0.03) 
ADY*MON 
   
-267.98 -318.29 
    
(0.04) (0.03) 
SUM*MON 
   
-95.47 -145.89 
    
(0.15) (0.05) 
SK2*MON 
    
-109.84 
     
(0.24) 
      Pseudo R2 0.0286 0.0356 0.0367 0.0342 0.0430 
 
Note: We report marginal effects at the variables mean from Tobit regressions and their 
corresponding   p-values in parenthesis immediately after. Standard errors are robust to 
misspecification and heteroskedasticity 
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TABLE 5 
Quantitative Importance of Illicit Flows in FDI Outflows from Transition Economies (2000 – 2003) 
        
Panel A.  Total FDI to Money Laundering Countries* (observed) 
 
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Macedonia Slovenia Estonia Total 
  Million US $ 4.6 215.6519 320.1671 1.1016 1589.141 2.5776 2133.2392 
  % of total FDI 80.7% 32.2% 11.6% 77.7% 40.3% 23.2% 28.89% 
        
Panel B.  Illicit Flows  to Money Laundering Countries (estimated by our model) 
  
 
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Macedonia Slovenia Estonia Total 
% of total FDI 20.55% 20.18% 20.38% 21.95% 20.53% 22.57% 21.03% 
        
Panel C.  FDI to Money laundering countries motivated by illicit Flows 
 Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Macedonia Slovenia Estonia Total 
Million US $ 0.95 43.52 65.25 0.24 326.25 0.58 436.79 
% of total FDI 16.58% 6.50% 2.37% 17.06% 8.28% 5.23% 5.91% 
        
 
  5 
TABLE   6 
Robustness Checks for FDI location choice model 
 
 Base 
Model 
Tax diff. Tax 
Haven 
Gov 1 Gov 2 Gov 3 Gov 4 Gov 5 Gov 6 Efficiency Infras. Cultural ALL  Walkers 
ADY 363.82 367.72 362.7 350.52 349.14 358.47 353.67 360.99 362.44 357.43 371.18 295.28 291.48 231.92 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
DIST -15.53 -13.54 -15.51 -15.33 -15.11 -15.52 -14.91 -15.44 -15.52 -15.27 -15.77 -13.9 -12.36 -9.9 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
SUM 160.12 188.82 156.91 151.81 140.54 159.2 149.06 157.79 160.23 135.51 134.83 181.66 174.91 17.24 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) 
SK2 188.17 114.81 189.94 235.65 239.98 194.25 269.25 192.01 187.56 230.99 191.19 184.65 218.02 201.99 
 
(0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
MON 51.52 68.6 51.79 49.51 49.23 52.91 49.98 51.43 51.77 49.51 48.04 58.04 71.6 0.21 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
ADY*MON -318.3 -316.29 -318.6 -309.8 -309.4 -314.4 -304.4 -315.4 -317.2 -315.7 -321.9 -250.9 -252.8 -0.5 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
SUM*MON -145.9 -170.9 -142.9 -138.6 -127.4 -145.6 -136 -143.6 -146 -122.9 -121.6 -168.4 -162.4 -0.02 
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.40) 
SK2*MON -109.8 -75.05 -113.39 -149.3 -159.3 -128.3 -183.5 -118.7 -112.2 -202.4 -98.5 -114.9 -136.9 -39.11 
 
(0.24) (0.42) (0.23) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.20) (0.23) (0.06) (0.28) (0.19) (0.20) (0.68) 
TAX 
 
3.04 
          
2.24 1.9 
  
(0.00) 
          
(0.00) (0.01) 
HAVEN 
  
-8.07 
         
-28.1 -72.1 
   
(0.69) 
         
(0.19) (0.05) 
VOI 
   
-26.98 
        
-5.73 0.7 
    
(0.03) 
        
(0.73) (0.97) 
POL 
    
-29.59 
       
-32 -28.2 
     
(0.01) 
       
(0.04) (0.10) 
                 6 
TABLE 6  continues 
                       
 Base 
Model 
Tax diff. Tax 
Haven 
Gov 1 Gov 2 Gov 3 Gov 4 Gov 5 Gov 6 Efficiency Infras. Cultural ALL  Walkers 
               EFF 
     
-10.2 
      
-8.41 -13.46 
      
(0.34) 
      
(0.81) (0.71) 
REG 
      
-40.03 
     
-36.21 -40.26 
       
(0.01) 
     
(0.13) (0.12) 
LAW 
       
-6.71 
    
60.56 72.62 
        
(0.54) 
    
(0.17) (0.12) 
CORRU 
        
-2.18 
   
-7.18 -35.09 
         
(0.83) 
   
(0.84) (0.36) 
UNEMP 
         
-2.04 
  
0.64 0.82 
          
(0.04) 
  
(0.49) (0.42) 
INTER 
          
0.08 
 
0.05 0.08 
           
(0.26) 
 
(0.53) (0.35) 
CUL 
           
350.36 325.68 349.63 
            
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
               Pseudo R2 0.043 0.0487 0.0433  0.044  0.046  0.043 0.046   0.043  0.043  0.046 0.044   0.056 0.065  0.060 
 
Note: We report marginal effects at the variables mean from Tobit regressions and their corresponding   p-values in parenthesis immediately after. Standard errors are 
robust to misspecification and heteroskedasticity 
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